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THE LEGITIMACY AND LIMITS OF PUNISHING “BAD
SAMARITANS”
Luke William Hunt*
Abstract
There are often public calls to codify moral sentiments after failures
to help others, and two recent tragedies have renewed interest in one’s
legal duty to aid another. This Article examines the moral underpinnings
and legitimacy of so-called “Bad Samaritan” laws—laws that criminalize
failures to aid others in emergency situations. Part I examines the
theoretical backdrop of duties imposed by Bad Samaritan laws, including
their relationship with various moral duties to aid. This leads to the
analysis in Part II, which examines two related questions that are raised
when moving from moral to legal duties: First, on what ground does the
state have the authority to dictate that one’s needs should be met in the
way specified by a particular legal duty? Second, does a special
relationship exist that legitimizes the establishment of such legal duties?
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INTRODUCTION
Consider two recent tragedies. On July 21, 2017, French philosopher
Anne Dufourmantelle was sunbathing at Pampelonne Beach, near St.
Tropez, when she noticed two children struggling in the water.1 An
orange flag on the beach had just been changed to red—indicating
dangerous conditions—yet Dufourmantelle immediately entered the
water to try to save the children.2 Although she drowned after being
carried away in a strong current, a lifeguard eventually saved the two

* Luke William Hunt, J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor, University of Alabama,
Department of Philosophy.
1. French philosopher Dufourmantelle drowns rescuing children, BBC NEWS (July
24, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40703606 [https://perma.cc/9KK5-2UKF]
(describing Dufourmantelle as having written “numerous essays on the importance of taking risks
and the need to accept that exposure to any number of possible threats is a part of everyday life.”).
2. Id.
355
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children.3 Most people would describe Dufourmantelle’s actions as
heroic and deserving of the utmost moral praise. Yet many would also
describe her act as supererogatory—in other words, one that is not
morally required because it is beyond the call of duty. After all, most
people do not always have the fortitude to rush into danger and face
death—even when another’s life is hanging in the balance. But perhaps
there is a middle ground—a less heroic action that one ought to take in
these situations. Maybe dialing 9-1-1 would satisfy one’s duty, or
ensuring that a lifeguard (if one is on hand) is aware of the emergency.
Now consider a situation similar to the one that Dufourmantelle faced—
but that played out much differently.
On July 9, 2017, five teenage boys watched Jamel Dunn drown in a
pond in Florida.4 Rather than simply dial 9-1-1, the teens filmed Dunn’s
drawn-out struggle in a two-minute long video on a cell phone.5 On the
video, the teens laugh and taunt Dunn as he repeatedly screams for help
and struggles to stay afloat.6 They did not report Dunn’s death to
authorities—though they posted the video of his death on the internet—
and Dunn’s body was not pulled from the water for five days.7 The teens
were not charged with failing to aid Dunn because—the state attorney’s
office explained—there is no Florida law “that compels an individual to
render, request or seek aid for a person in distress.”8 If there was no legal
duty or obligation to aid Dunn, should there have been? Although many
would consider it unreasonable for the law to require the level of heroism
displayed by Dufourmantelle, should the teens have been required to at
least aid Dunn by calling 9-1-1? But even if it is left at that minimal
requirement, what is the moral basis and limit of such laws?9 One might
attempt to answer these questions by examining the enactment of so3. Id.
4. Ralph Ellis, Nick Valencia & Devon Sayers, Chief to Recommend Charges Against
Florida Teens Who Recorded Drowning, CNN (July 22, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/
07/21/us/florida-teens-drowning-man/?iid=ob_lockedrail_topeditorial [https://perma.cc/9MHMUFSE].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. However, the police chief indicated “that he will recommend that the state attorney
prosecute the teens under a statute that requires a person with knowledge of a death to notify a
medical examiner” (which would be a misdemeanor under that statute). Id.
9. A second, related question is the extent to which the omissions of the relevant parties
caused Dunn’s death. I note only two general difficulties with this issue. First, if failures of action
are to count as causes of events, then there seems to be no non-arbitrary way to restrict the scope
of failures of action that are to be considered causes of events—in this case Dunn’s death. Second,
the simple fact that the teens may have prevented Dunn’s death by calling 9-1-1 does not
demonstrate that the many other events and circumstances involved in Dunn’s death were
insufficient to cause his death. See Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm, 9
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 253–59 (1980), for a fuller account of these arguments.
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called “Bad Samaritan” laws. Unlike “Good Samaritan” laws (which
offer legal protection to one who provides reasonable assistance to
another in need), Bad Samaritan laws make it a crime to fail to aid others
in emergency situations when providing aid would be easy.10
There are often public calls to codify our moral sentiments after tragic
failures to help others.11 For example, during the aftermath of Hurricane
Sandy, it was revealed that a young woman was refused aid from
neighbors after rising water separated her from her two young children;
her children were later found dead nearby.12 The event prompted one
commentator in the New York Times to suggest that it would be
appropriate to enact the following law: “Any person who knows that
another is in imminent danger, or has sustained serious physical harm,
and who fails to render reasonable assistance, shall be fined up to
$5,000.00, imprisoned up to three months, or both.”13 More recently,
legal scholars have argued that “certain witnesses who are not physically
present at the scene of a crime [“Digital Age Samaritans”] should be held
criminally accountable for failing to report specified violent offenses of
which they are aware.”14 This Article examines the moral underpinnings
and legitimacy of such laws.
Ironically, I say little about the details of Bad Samaritan laws
themselves because that is well-covered ground.15 Instead, Part I
10. A handful of states have Bad Samaritan laws. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS,
chapter 4 (1984) (discussed in this section), for more on legal duties to rescue. Although this
paper focuses upon Bad Samaritan (duty-to-rescue) laws, many states have passed duty-to-report
statutes. Some of these statues are narrowly tailored (e.g., restricting the duty to report to violent
crimes against children), while others are broader (e.g., the duty to report criminal activity
generally). Many of these laws are based upon special relationships. Somewhat related, there is
also “misprision of felony” (concealing one's knowledge of another's criminal activity to the
authorities), which often requires active concealment. Of course, more broadly, it should be noted
that the criminal law does not come close to complying with, say, Mill’s Harm Principle, e.g.,
harmless crimes might include inchoate crimes (attempt, conspiracy, solicitation), possession
crimes, status crimes (public intoxication), and so on—though, there is, of course, debate about
what qualifies as “harm.”
11. Faith Karimi, Teens who laughed and recorded a drowning man in his final moments
won’t face charges, CNN (June 26, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/26/us/florida-teens-nocharges-drowning-man/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZE8Y-VC95]. A friend of Dunn’s sister
started a petition to change Florida law. Id.
12. Jay Sterling Silver, Can the Law Make Us Be Decent, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/opinion/can-the-law-make-bad-samaritans-be-decent.html
[https://perma.cc/Q4MF-ZWNS].
13. Id.
14. Zachary D. Kaufman, Digital Age Samaritans, 62 B.C. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2021).
15. For example, A.D. Woozley addressed the potential problems with Bad Samaritan laws
in a well-known article thirty-five years ago. See A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some
Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1273 (1983); see also Alison McIntyre, Guilty
Bystanders? On the Legitimacy of Duty to Rescue Statutes, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 157 (1994)
(discussed in this section).
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examines the broader, theoretical backdrop of duties imposed by Bad
Samaritan laws, including their relationship with various moral duties to
aid.16 This leads to the analysis in Part II, which examines two related
questions that are raised when moving from moral to legal duties: First,
on what ground does the state have the authority to dictate that one’s
needs should be met in the way specified by a particular legal duty?17
Second, does a special relationship exist that justifies the establishment
of such legal duties?18 The answers to these questions are of interest
inasmuch as they shed light on the relationships among our actions, our
laws, and the well-being of others.
I. RESCUE AND BENEFICENCE
The list of positive moral duties owed by individual persons may
include rescue, beneficence, and justice.19 This Article focuses on the
relationship between the first two of these potential duties and how they
are related to legal duties to aid: rescue, the duty to aid others in
emergency situations, and beneficence, the duty to promote the wellbeing of others.20 To be clear, then, I am interested in the state’s authority
to compel one in one’s individual capacity to help another, not the state’s
authority to address broader principles of justice that affect general
welfare on an institutional level. Accordingly, this paper would not apply
to, say, state mandates requiring the populace to wear masks or get
vaccinations to protect the general welfare during a public health
emergency such as a pandemic—mandates that strike me as justified and
legitimate given institutional demands of justice.
The above tripartite conception of positive moral duties implies that
rescue and beneficence are distinct. But as almost every undergraduate
philosophy student knows, Peter Singer’s classic paper on the topic
suggests that there are questions about whether duties of rescue and
beneficence may be distinguished in nonarbitrary ways. These sorts of
questions led Singer to the well-known conclusion that our positive moral
duties are conceivably without limit. Whatever one might think of
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.
18. Id.
19. See Luke William Hunt, The Global Ethics of Helping and Harming, 36.4 HUM. RTS.
Q. 798 (2014), for an account of duties of rescue and beneficence in the international context.
Positive moral duties typically mean that one is obliged to take some sort of step or action, rather
than merely refrain from taking some sort of step or action (i.e., a negative duty).
20. The third potential positive duty, justice, is typically considered an institutional
principle, such that an individual’s primary duty is to support just institutions. See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 47 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2003). However, others have argued that if
individuals have a duty to support just institutions, then they also have a duty to support the just
ends those institutions strive to bring about. See, e.g., Liam Murphy, Institutions and the Demands
of Justice, 27.4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 283 (1998).
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Singer’s argument, the underlying questions are relevant with respect to
any positive legal duties the state may impose to aid others in one’s
individual capacity—though, as discussed in Part II, they are relevant in
surprising ways.
One of the core questions is whether there is a nonarbitrary way to
draw the line between rescue and beneficence. If not, one would seem to
be left with some untenable options, including: (1) drawing a line that
reflects an arbitrary limit to our positive duties; (2) accepting that we have
essentially unlimited positive duties; or (3) accepting that our positive
duties are quite limited. There are several prominent theories—including
one by Liam Murphy and one by Garrett Cullity—that have attempted to
overcome the obstacle presented by the first option, namely locating a
nonarbitrary limit to our duty of beneficence.21 To help motivate the
problem, first consider the difficulties that arise when analyzing duties to
rescue.
A. Rescue
There is no shortage of literature on the question of rescue. The field
is rife with colorful moral dilemmas, and a random sampling will likely
include runaway trolley cars, drowning babies, and, in some variations,
pools full of drowning babies, that are supposed to explain one’s moral
duties.22 While these scenarios are instructive in making narrow points—
and while it is presumably not impossible that one will find oneself in a
pool of drowning babies—there is a reasonable concern that
philosophical analysis of these hypothetical situations does not accurately
reflect the process by which one actually analyzes moral questions. One
worry is that pondering only whether one has the duty to make a split
second decision to switch a trolley car from a track with three people tied
on it to a track with two people leads to the conclusion that our duties
should be based simply on their ability to produce good consequences in
even the most unlikely of situations.23 But as Dunn’s case illustrates,
rescue is an important practical moral question even if most of us
experience such situations rarely.
Joel Feinberg’s comprehensive analysis of rescue in Harm to Others,
which generally argues that there should be a legal duty to rescue, is an
21. Hunt, supra note 19, at 800 (considering these three options in the international context
regarding the potential duties that affluent states owe to the distant needy).
22. See, e.g., Molly Crockett, The Trolley Problem: Would You Kill One Person to Save
Many Others?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2016, 11:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/
head-quarters/2016/dec/12/the-trolley-problem-would-you-kill-one-person-to-save-many-others
[https://perma.cc/33J7-XSA3]; Marko Milanovic, The Drowning Child, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 3,
2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-drowning-child/ [https://perma.cc/8WGS-ZMY6].
23. See TALBOT BREWER, THE RETRIEVAL OF ETHICS 69‒70 (2009), for an analysis of the
potential problems with this way of approaching practical problems.
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appropriate starting point.24 It is representative of a general problem in
the project of distinguishing legal and moral duties of rescue from
beneficence: drawing a line at the point at which one’s duty to rescue
ends seems like an arbitrary affair. Feinberg’s argument is centered on
the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties and determinate and
indeterminate persons, and their respective rights (imperfect duties lack
determinate recipients with correlative rights, while perfect duties
involve determinate recipients with correlative rights).25 The perfect duty
to rescue a determinate person entails that the determinate person has a
right to be rescued from harm.26
Conversely, the imperfect duty to rescue indeterminate persons does
not entail a right of indeterminate persons to be saved.27 So the teens
mentioned earlier would presumably have a perfect duty to attempt to
rescue (say, by calling 9-1-1) Dunn, a determinate recipient, who would
presumably have a right to be rescued by the teens. But what if one
encounters two determinate persons—two persons drowning in a pool,
say—and is only capable of saving one? Feinberg seems to blur the
perfect and the imperfect, and the determinate and the indeterminate, by
arguing that one has an imperfect duty to rescue as many persons as
possible.28 Moreover, each person has a right that the rescuer rescue as
many as possible.29
But if Feinberg relies on the perfect/imperfect duty dichotomy, a
problem arises with the last point about imperfect duties and the rights of
multiple determinate persons. In the case involving two determinate
drowning persons—only one of whom may be saved—Feinberg seems to
say that each drowning person does have a right: a right that the rescuer
save one of them if it is only possible to save one. The problem is that
this does not seem fundamentally unlike Feinberg’s claim that
indeterminate persons do not have a right to be rescued; this is because
the second, determinate drowning person (who cannot be saved) is
analogous to one of the many indeterminate, distant needy (who cannot
be saved), yet one has a right to be rescued and the other does not.30
24. FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 185–86.
25. Id. at 134.
26. Id. at 134.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 147.
29. Id.
30. See MICHAEL A. MENLOWE, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A DUTY TO RESCUE,
THE DUTY TO RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 19–21 (1993), for a discussion of these
problems in Feinberg’s argument. In any event, if Feinberg’s goal is to morally distinguish
determinate sets (e.g., of babies) from non-determinate sets (e.g., the distant needy), then it would
perhaps be more plausible to argue that one has a perfect duty to use one’s discretion to choose
who to save in a determinate set, while saving as many as possible. Each baby would thus have a
right against a rescuer that the rescuer select and maximize, not a right to be saved. I will suggest
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Why is this so? Here, one may ask to what extent there are factual
differences between the duty to rescue as many drowning persons as
possible and the duty (or lack thereof) to rescue as many of the distant
needy as possible. Of course, there are many factual differences between
the two cases, including: (A) physical distance, (B) experiential impact,
(C) multiple potential rescuers, and (D) causal nature of aid. 31 However,
the important question is the extent to which these factual differences are
different in a relevant way.
Through a great many colorful examples, Peter Unger has argued that
these and other factual differences are not morally relevant to our duty to
rescue the distant needy.32 They can be summed up in a more general way
by treating differences such as (A) and (B) similarly and differences such
as (C) and (D) similarly. Regarding (A) and (B), sending $100.00 in the
mail to help a dying child over 8,000 miles away obviously has a different
experiential impact from pulling a drowning baby from a pool. What is
less obvious is how this is relevant. The dying child 8,000 miles away is
no less real, and, presumably, one could take a flight to a distant land,
make one’s way to an Oxfam station (or some other effective
organization), contribute $100.00 in person, and experience first-hand the
rescue of a dying child. It just so happens that it would be much more
efficient, and equally effective, to send the $100.00 in the mail.
The factual differences represented by (C) and (D) have to do with,
respectively, the impersonal nature of aiding the distant needy because
there are a great many rescuers (all the affluent people in the world) and
there are a great many needy persons (all the many distant needy dying
around world). However, consider how Dunn’s case illustrates (C): You
and four friends are relaxing by a pond and notice a man drowning.
Assume each of your friends is able to rescue the man easily (by calling
9-1-1, for example), but they do not do so for various reasons. It is
difficult to see how your duty to rescue the man is affected by the fact
that many others are able to do so.
This seems to be roughly analogous to our situation with respect to
the distant needy. The fact that there are many others who could send
money to the distant needy does not seem to affect my duty to do so.
Conversely, the circumstances represented by (D) illustrate how the sheer
volume of those in need make it difficult to see how one’s meager
$100.00 has any real causal impact. For instance, it is impossible to say
that one’s $100.00 donation to Oxfam makes a difference to some
particular, identifiable child in a distant country. It is certainly true that
that such moves do not address whether determinate sets are morally different from indeterminate
sets.
31. See PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH & LETTING DIE 33–49 (1996), for a description of these
and other factual differences between cases of rescue and distant aid.
32. Id.
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one’s $100.00 donation is a mere drop in the bucket of the millions of
other donations, which permit lives to be saved collectively. However, as
Unger puts it, it is difficult to see how there is any moral relevance “to
the precise character of the causal relations between the well-off and
those whom, whether collectively or not, they might help save.”33 In a
sense, then, need and necessity are the ends of the stories in cases of both
rescue and beneficence.34
In spite of Feinberg’s complex analysis of duties and rights, we seem
to be left where we started, namely, questioning the extent to which there
is a moral duty to rescue and whether there is any nonarbitrary way to
distinguish such a duty from the duty to help the distant needy (or a duty
of beneficence). To be sure, Feinberg’s argument seems to suggest that
we have a duty to rescue as many people as we are able—at least if they
are drowning in a swimming pool in front of us—because those people
have a right to be rescued. But if we have a duty to rescue as many
people—whether in a swimming pool or otherwise—as we are able, and
there is no relevant difference between those in the pool and those in
distant lands, we need a more expansive theory regarding duties of
beneficence.
B. Beneficence
Dunn’s case illustrates the move to beneficence. Assuming that a
simple call to 9-1-1 could have saved Dunn (seeing as he struggled in the
pond for minutes), and assuming that the teens had a moral duty to rescue
Dunn in this way, do the teens have the same moral duty to save a dying
child in a distant land by simply mailing a $100.00 check to Oxfam?35
And there is certainly more than one starving child, which raises the
question of whether the teens should send a second $100.00 check, and
third, and so on, especially if it only means that they will have less
disposable income to purchase “weed” (which the teens admitted to
smoking around the time Dunn drowned).36
One might argue that the Dunn case is not an appropriate example
because it would have been difficult for the teens to know with certainty
that Dunn—an adult—would die as a result of them not calling 9-1-1
33. Id. at 49.
34. Feinberg and others would still want to say that determinateness adds something
morally significant to rescue situations. There is clearly something factually different in cases
when there is a determinate rescuer and rescuee, but, following Unger, it remains unclear what
the moral difference is exactly. Perhaps there is a special relationship between determinate
rescuers and rescuees—similar to familial or contractual relationships—that precludes the distant
needy from possessing rights. I would submit that the nature of rescue relationships seems
inherently different than the sorts of special relationships that will be discussed in Part II.
35. Karimi, supra note 11.
36. Id.
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(notwithstanding the fact that they taunted him in the video, saying that
he was going to die).37 That said, the teens would have known at least
two facts: (1) Dunn’s interests were in jeopardy such that he was in need
of assistance, and (2) it was necessary to take easy steps in order to
attempt to meet Dunn’s need. Similarly, in the case of beneficence, one
knows there are persons in distant countries with vital needs. The
identities of these persons and precise nature of their needs are not
known, but one is quite sure that there are options that may meet the needs
of these persons, including sending $100.00 to Oxfam. One does not
know exactly how this contribution will help and so—as in Dunn’s
case—one is only left with certain basic facts: someone is in need, and
one can either act or not act upon the various options at one’s disposal in
an attempt to address those needs.
But there are many people in need. And if the distinction between
cases of rescue and cases of beneficence are artificial, then our duties are
very extreme indeed. Based in part on the following two principles, this
is of course the point that Singer made over forty years ago: (1) “Suffering
and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad,” and (2)
“[i]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought,
morally, to do it.”38 Accordingly, if one sees a child drowning in a
shallow pond, one ought to pull the child out even if doing so means one’s
clothes will get muddy, which is insignificant when compared to the
death of the child. And for reasons similar to the ones that have been
noted (geographic distance, multiple potential rescuers, etc.), Singer
argues that his two principles apply to helping the distant needy in the
same way they apply to rescuing the child in the pond: We are morally
required to give a great deal of our time, money, and resources to things
such as famine relief, rather than spending it on “trivia.”39 It would be an
understatement to say Singer’s paper generated a great deal of
disagreement regarding one’s duty to help the distant needy.40 The
disagreement may be distilled to the following concern: Although there
might be some duty to help the distant needy, there should be some
practical way to limit that duty such that one is not reduced to a state of
near poverty.41
37. Id.
38. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 231 (1972)
(providing an alternative, weaker version of the argument by removing “comparable” from the
second premise).
39. Id. at 241.
40. See generally John Arthur, Rights and the Duty to Bring Aid, in WORLD HUNGER AND
MORAL OBLIGATION 37 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1977) (responding to Singer’s
position).
41. See Hunt, supra note 19, at 807 (making these points about Singer’s paper as they relate
to duties owed by affluent states to peoples in other states).

364

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 31

Liam Murphy addressed this concern with a comprehensive theory he
calls the “collective principle of beneficence,” which attempts to make
sense of the extreme demands required by the utilitarianism represented
in Singer’s argument.42 From the outset, Murphy suggests that the
demands of utilitarianism are extreme only because we view them in
terms of the partial compliance of others.43 In other words, our duty to
help others seems so extreme because most people do not comply with
their duty to help others.44 If everyone did their fair share in aiding the
needy, then the demands on each one of us would be reduced
drastically.45 This failure of others to comply with their duty is the basis
of Murphy’s theory, which accounts for the failure with a “compliance
condition.”46 The compliance condition states that one’s duty of
beneficence should not exceed one’s duty under conditions in which
everyone else complied fully with their duty of beneficence.47
The condition implies that the real problem with utilitarianism is not
that it is overly demanding, but rather that it does not treat all persons as
rational agents who are capable of performing their duty.48 Although
utilitarianism typically disregards those who do not comply with their
duty (almost as if they do not exist), the compliance condition affirms
that non-compliers are agents who are assigned a certain portion of the
work of beneficence.49 Moreover, one does not have to pick up their
slack, so to speak, by performing the portion of work they are failing to
perform. The final formulation of Murphy’s theory is lengthy and
complex, but I take the key points to be as follows:
(1) Everyone has a duty to take actions that will
optimize aggregate well-being.
(2) However, in circumstances in which everyone does
not comply with (1), one is not required to sacrifice more
than one would have to sacrifice under circumstances in
which everyone did comply with (1).
(3) Therefore, in circumstances in which everyone does
not comply with (1), one has a duty to take actions—

42. LIAM B. MURPHY, MORAL DEMANDS IN NONIDEAL THEORY 5–6 (2000). See also Hunt,
supra note 19, at 810 (summarizing Murphy’s work using a similar analysis to address the extent
to which affluent states owe duties of rescue and beneficence to the needs of those in other states).
43. MURPHY, supra note 42, at 117.
44. Hunt, supra note 19, at 810.
45. Id.
46. MURPHY, supra note 42, at 97–101. See also Hunt, supra note 19, at 810.
47. Hunt, supra note 19, at 810.
48. MURPHY, supra note 42, at 9–13.
49. Id.
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within the parameters of (2)—that will optimize
aggregate well-being.50
This is a compelling theory, but there are two potential problems with
the collective principle of beneficence. First, Murphy’s theory does not
seem adequate unless one adds several rules and prohibitions. For
example, if one’s individual duty is limited by (2) above, and one
complies with (3) above, then what happens if one subsequently
encounters a person drowning in a pool—or sees someone in need of a
simple call to 9-1-1, such as Dunn? If one has already completed one’s
duty in (3), then one is under no obligation to take additional actions to
help others—regardless of whether those others are 8,000 miles away or
face-to-face. Conversely, people who are very bad off would seem to be
completely off the hook when it comes to rescuing others. Because the
very poor are already the worst off in society, their status may preclude
them from being factored into the collective calculus of sacrifice
allotments. It is unclear exactly how the collective principle of
beneficence would cultivate a duty to rescue in such cases. Murphy
acknowledges that we may have to think of rescue as simply a good rule
of thumb. Unfortunately, this leads one back to Singer’s position that
there is no sensible reason to react differently to cases of rescue and
beneficence, ultimately leaving the collective principle of beneficence as
a somewhat arbitrary limitation of the duty of beneficence.51
Garrett Cullity attempted to address some of these problems in The
Moral Demands of Affluence. Indeed, his theory is said to provide the
basis for a nonarbitrary limitation to the duty of beneficence. Rather than
base the limitation on the notion of one’s fair share of a collective duty,
Cullity proposes an “aggregate approach.” Cullity suggests that one is
excused from the duty of beneficence when the aggregate cost of one’s
successive contributions of beneficence reaches a certain point.52 By
rejecting the extreme demands of beneficence and embracing an
aggregate approach, Cullity gives us the following account of
beneficence: one has a duty to give aggregately until going further would
worsen one’s life by a “requirement-grounding amount” (the sort of
50. Id. at 117.
51. Despite its limitations, the collective principle of beneficence is of course an impressive
theory for dealing with the extreme demands of utilitarianism because it shifts the burden of
beneficence to a collective unit. It seems reasonable to ground institutional and collective
principles in our ethical intuitions, but when those principles are reduced to individual experiences
it is unclear how exactly they apply to each one of us. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE
LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 102–03 (1985), for an analysis of how institutional theories ultimately lead
“back to the original, Kantian, universalistic concerns of such a theory.”
52. GARRETT CULLITY, THE MORAL DEMANDS OF AFFLUENCE 82 (2004). In taking this
approach, Cullity rejects both the “severe demand” and the “extreme demand” of beneficence (the
former is the general view that our duty of beneficence is very demanding, as represented by
Singer). Id. at 70–82.
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goods in which one is justified in having an interest because they would
not preclude one from helping a person simply because that person has
an interest in such goods)53 with the caveats that one may (1) live a “nonaltruistically directed life” (one that does not comply with the extreme
demands of a life-altering duty of beneficence) and (2) seek “commitment
goods” (e.g., personal relationships, worthwhile personal projects)54
within that life.55
How is one justified in living a life that rejects the extreme demands
of beneficence to which Singer and others have alerted us? Cullity argues
that one’s right to live a non-altruistic life is based upon the fact that other
people’s interests in the fulfillment of a non-altruistic life provide us with
morally compelling reasons to help them.56 In other words, almost no one
complies with the extreme demand of beneficence, and the morally
compelling reason to help other people does not disappear just because
they do not live altruistically focused lives in the way the extreme demand
would require. For Cullity, then, it follows that it must be morally
permissible for each one of us to likewise pursue such a life, and the outer
limit of the duty of beneficence is thus the point at which one can no
longer live such a life.57
Cullity acknowledges that there is no general way to apply his theory
to everyone because the interests of each person vary, as do the things
one considers life-enhancing.58 One person may have requirementgrounding goods (friendships, aptitudes, and so on) that are more
expensive than another person’s requirement-grounding goods, thus
justifying a more expensive lifestyle.59 Although it seems right to say that
the goods that are important to people, as well as the costs of those goods,
vary a great deal, it is difficult to say exactly how this should affect one’s
duty of beneficence. Cullity attempts to address the subjectivity of this
question by providing some practical examples regarding how one should
generally spend one’s money (for instance, some expensive purchases
should be considered morally indefensible, such as a car or books for a
private library, though expensive tertiary education might be morally
defensible because it is life-enhancing).60
The problem is not that the implications of Cullity’s theory appear
puritanical (many seem perfectly reasonable), but rather that the sorts of
intuitions underlying the theory can seem to approach the status quo.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 150–51.
Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 133–36.
CULLITY, supra note 52, at 146.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 180–83.

2021]

THE LEGITIMACY AND LIMITS OF PUNISHING “BAD SAMARITANS”

367

There is an underlying concern that the approach permits affluent people
to more or less continue living as they currently do, while being more
conservative in their spending on certain (superficial) items. Moreover,
one reaches an impasse if there are disagreements regarding another’s
fundamental conception of what is “life enhancing,” or which goods are
morally indefensible. To put it another way, the aggregate approach
seems to obscure what it means to say one has a duty to do or not do
something. In some sense, then, the aggregate approach—like the
collective principle of beneficence—can seem to permit one to continue
acting the way one is accustomed to acting based upon one’s intuitions.61
II. FROM MORAL DUTIES TO LEGAL DUTIES
Given the limits of Murphy’s and Cullity’s (otherwise compelling)
theories to constrain duties of beneficence, this part of the Article
considers a variation of the third option presented at the outset: the idea
that we have limited moral duties that legitimize positive legal duties. In
other words, if the distinction between a duty of rescue and a duty of
beneficence is in some sense arbitrary, and if the noted theories fail to
limit a duty of beneficence in a nonarbitrary way, then the state is
constrained in imposing legal duties to aid others in one’s individual
capacity (e.g., via Bad Samaritan Laws) without some principled,
independent basis of authority to do so.62 Of course, this does not mean
that we have few positive moral duties (this Article takes no position on
the extent and basis of one’s positive moral duties, aside from suggesting
that the above theories do not establish clear limits on a duty of
beneficence), but rather that we have somewhat limited positive moral
duties that legitimize positive legal duties in one’s individual capacity.
This position is in some sense similar to the argument in political
philosophy that one does not have a moral duty to obey the law simply
because a need or necessity exists. Rather, a moral duty to obey the law
must be based upon the state’s legitimacy with respect to the law—even
though one may have an independent moral duty to meet a need with
61. It should again be noted that neither Murphy’s nor Cullity’s theories explicitly account
for the problem of rescue. While Murphy relies on “agents’ motives and character” in rescue
cases, Cullity states the following regarding encountering a rescue situation in which one’s
aggregate duty had already been met: “I could save the person’s life and then, if it costs me
anything, take that into account as part of my overall budget for contributing to saving the lives
of strangers; or I could let the person die, and spend the whole of that budget on donations to aid
agencies.” Cullity suggests that the former option would be morally right because failures of
rescue are more blameworthy in that they are more “vividly inescapable.” MURPHY, supra note
42, at 132; CULLITY, supra note 52, at 200. Both Murphy and Cullity’s solutions seem to be
cloaked ways of saying simply that we have good reasons to rescue people.
62. I take the second option—the view that we have essentially unlimited positive duties—
to be some form of unrestrained utilitarianism. That option will not be addressed.
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which a law is concerned.63 The position here is that contingent claims of
need in cases of rescue and beneficence do not necessarily give rise to
legitimate legal duties to meet those claims of need (though they might).
Rather, the idea is that any legitimate legal requirement to aid others must
be based upon the state’s claim of authority to impose such requirements.
Evaluating the legitimacy of Bad Samaritan Laws can thus be addressed
in part by answering the following related questions: (1) On what ground
does a state have the authority to dictate that one’s needs should be met
in the way specified by a particular legal duty? (2) Does a special
relationship exist that authorizes the establishment of such legal duties?
The first question has to do with the state’s authority to enact duties
to aid others. Even if everyone agrees that such laws are justified,
intrinsically and instrumentally superior to alternative arrangements, that
does not necessarily answer the question about the state’s authority to
impose them. One way to answer the first question is to say that the state
must have authority in virtue of its legitimacy—the moral right to
command (and have its command obeyed) that one’s needs should be met
in the way specified by a legal duty.64 There are multiple accounts
regarding why a state might have this sort of authority.
Roughly, one might categorize accounts of legitimacy and their
correlative duties to obey the law as transactional, natural, or
associative.65 Transactional accounts are based upon our interactions with
others and include theories based upon special obligations that arise from
consent and general duties that arise from fairness (e.g., one has a general
duty to the state in light of the benefits one receives from the state).66
Natural duty theorists argue that just states are legitimate, and one has a
moral duty to support just and good states because they are just and
good.67 Finally, associative theories claim that states may subject persons
63. This issue was debated in CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN & A. JOHN SIMMONS, IS
THERE A DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW? (2005) (Wellman argues that we have a duty to obey based
upon “samaritanism,” which, roughly, includes two descriptive premises and one moral premise
(the third premise): “(1) states secure vital benefits that (2) could not be secured by any other,
non-coercive means….[and (3)] one’s normally decisive position of moral dominion can be
overridden by particularly urgent, and therefore morally preemptory, concerns.” Id. at 23. In part
II of the book, Simmons argues that samaritanism does not give rise to a moral duty to obey the
law, and, here, I invoke Simmons’s view to show how positive moral duties to aid others
legitimate limited legal duties to aid).
64. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, Justification and Legitimacy, in JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY:
ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 130 (2001), for an account of the distinction between a
state’s justification and its legitimacy.
65. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS, ch. 3 (1979)
and WELLMAN & SIMMONS, supra note 63, at part II, for an account of the weaknesses of each of
these theories.
66. SIMMONS, supra note 65, at 63–64.
67. See PLATO, Crito, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS (John M. Cooper ed., 1997), for an early
account of a natural duty theory (in which Socrates suggests that it would be wrong to disobey
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to legitimate authority because states are the kinds of associations that
generate obligations; this is analogous to a duty one might owe to one’s
parent or sibling by virtue simply of occupying the duty–laden role of
“son” or “brother.”68
Each of these theories has significant–—though not necessarily
conclusive—shortcomings. To be sure, these brief remarks do not scratch
the surface of the voluminous work on legitimacy and authority.69
Defending and justifying one theory or another is not this Article’s goal,
but it is plausible to think that many liberal states in some sense embrace
transactional theories based upon reciprocation and fairness: In the
context of liberal societies, persons are often viewed as reciprocators who
have a fair share of the collective labor. This means that persons are
viewed as having a general duty to the collective because it would be
wrong to reap the benefits of the collective as a free rider who takes
advantage of others’ good faith compliance. The point is that
reciprocation is presumed to be central to the ideal of the liberal state:
Liberal states are just political societies based upon a collective enterprise
in which persons do their part to keep it running.70 This is
notwithstanding theoretical problems with the idea, including that some
benefits provided by the collective may not have been accepted
voluntarily or explicitly by all members of the collective (though perhaps
many benefits are accepted tacitly).71 But this and other complaints about
reciprocation do not undermine the fundamental role that reciprocation
seems to play in liberal states. This is not a particularly controversial or
dogmatic claim because the idea of reciprocation—in one form or
another—is significant in the work of many liberal theorists who embrace
pluralism.72
This brief sketch of legitimacy does raise an important point about the
extent to which states in the liberal tradition may dictate that one’s needs
the law and flee Athens because he has a duty not to harm the state and the moral value of its
Law).
68. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, ch. 2 (1986), for an account of associative
theories.
69. The work on legitimacy and authority—not to mention “philosophical anarchism” and
states’ illegitimacy—is voluminous. See, for example, SIMMONS, supra note 65, at 102–21, for an
account of how problems with the various theories of legitimacy might lead one to philosophical
anarchism.
70. There are of course many liberal philosophers who do not view reciprocation as the
basis of legitimacy, but this does not mean that reciprocation is not a fundamental aspect of the
liberal ideal.
71. See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 65, at 129.
72. See LUKE WILLIAM HUNT, THE RETRIEVAL OF LIBERALISM IN POLICING 29–30 (2019),
in which I draw upon the work of a variety of liberal theorists to support the role of reciprocation
in liberal states generally and liberal policing specifically. There, I note that “the ideal of the
liberal state does not preclude the possibility that a state’s legitimacy could be based upon a
combination of factors and theories in addition to reciprocation.” Id. at 55–56.
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should be met in the way specified by a particular legal duty one has in
one’s individual capacity (rather than the demands of justice in an
institutional context). This is in part because each of the theories for
legitimacy mentioned above—transactional, natural, and associative—
suggest that the state’s authority and power is limited. The limit might be
based upon the extent to which the citizenry voluntarily divested power
to the state, the contours of their associative relationship with the state,
or the extent to which it would be fair for them to reciprocate in light of
the benefits received from the state.
The extent to which states are limited in these ways highlights a
problem with Bad Samaritan Laws: Any limits placed upon such laws are
in some sense arbitrary given the shortcomings of the earlier theories
(from Part I) to distinguish between rescue and beneficence.73 If the state
has the authority to compel people to engage in easy rescues in their
individual capacity, then—given the shortcomings of the earlier
theories—there is no nonarbitrary way to limit the state’s authority to
enact laws that require one to engage in a great many other positive duties
to meet the needs of others in one’s individual capacity.74 In a sense, then,
Bad Samaritan Laws are conceivably without limits and indicative of
unlimited state authority to compel individuals to “do good.” Of course,
unlimited or arbitrarily limited authority is contrary to the fundamental
principles of liberal states, which are presumably constrained by political
norms such as the rule of law. A state with a dictate to oversee the moral
character of all its citizens is akin to the ultra-paternalistic city-state
illustrated in Plato’s Laws—a state in which “[t]he purpose of the law is
not merely to protect one’s interests, but rather to make one better off in
every respect. . . . to secure a good and virtuous life for the
citizens . . . .”75 Although improving one’s moral character might seem
like a good idea in principle, it is not typically construed as part of the
mandate of liberal states.
Consider further the analogy regarding the legal duty to aid others in
one’s individual capacity and an argument for the moral duty to obey the
law, namely, that the moral duty to obey the law is based upon the simple
claim that human beings need government, which necessitates
compliance with the law.76 For example, necessity arguments for obeying
73. See supra Part I.
74. I am not suggesting that such a legal requirement would be inconsistent with a moral
duty to aid (we may very well have expansive moral duties to aid others beyond easy rescue
situations), but rather that such legal requirements may be inconsistent with the state’s authority.
Moreover, the issue here is the state’s authority to require duties of rescue and beneficence in
one’s individual capacity. The state may very well have the authority to promote the general
welfare of the polity based upon broader, institutional principles of justice.
75. Luke William Hunt, The Law in Plato’s Laws: A Reading of the ‘Classical Thesis’, 35
POLIS 102, 124 (2018).
76. WELLMAN & SIMMONS, supra note 63, at 121.
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the law are derived from natural moral duties, which A. John Simmons
has described as grounded either “(a) in the moral importance of
advancing some impartial moral good or (b) in some moral duty thought
to be owed by all persons to all others as moral equals, regardless of roles,
relationships, or transactions.”77 It is thus easy to see how a legal duty to
aid others in one’s individual capacity may be compared with a necessity
argument based upon this understanding of a natural duty.
The intuitions involved in this sort of argument are similar to the ones
that form the basis of a legal duty to rescue a drowning child, make a 91-1 call, and so on. To put the analogy simply, other persons are our moral
equals; they have certain biological needs, which necessitate and justify
a legal duty to aid them. Although this is compelling from the perspective
of one’s individual moral duties, such necessity accounts must show how
the claims of those in need of aid authorize a governmental entity to
dictate how those needs should be met legally by one in one’s individual
capacity.
In his critique of necessity claims for a duty to obey the law, Simmons
argues that it is unclear how a person’s needs authorize another to dictate
anything in particular about that need: “The fact that I am ill and hungry
and need care does not on its face seem to give any other person or group
authority to dictate to me (and/or others, absent my and/or their consent)
in whatever ways are required to meet my need.”78 This point highlights
a straightforward difference between moral and legal duties to aid:
although a moral duty of rescue or beneficence might be described as a
duty to offer aid to one in need, a legal duty to aid is based on
governmental authority to compel one to meet the needs of another in a
specific way.
There is certainly a strong case that easy rescue situations involving
life or death—particularly those in which there exist a determinate
number of rescuers and rescuees—generate moral duties of aid.79 While
it might seem intuitive to extend such moral duty to aid to a legal duty to
aid, there must be a basis for the government’s authority to legally compel
one to comply with one’s individual, positive moral duties (as opposed to
addressing the broader principles of justice that affect general welfare on
an institutional level).

77. Id. at 121.
78. Id. at 131. Simmons analyzes necessity accounts provided by Elizabeth Anscombe and
Tony Honoré, who both support their positions with examples of family relationships. However,
as Simmons notes, the intuitive correctness of these sorts of examples is based in large part on the
traditional conviction that family members owe duties to each other. And while one might argue
that there is similar intuitive force regarding claims that one has a duty to rescue another in an
emergency situation, the intuition is much less powerful when extended to the distant needy.
79. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 287–88 (1980).
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Alison McIntyre supports the intuition by arguing that one’s duty to
perform easy rescues is based upon one’s public duty as a citizen, which
is analogous to the public duties of law enforcement and other emergency
services.80 For example, one’s community undertakes to protect property
against damage from fire by providing fire departments.81 That said, it
would be impractical for communities to appoint “fire monitors” with
contractual duties to alert the fire department if they see signs of fire.82
Instead, this public duty is left to the citizens in the same way firefighters
perform public duties rather than private duties with respect to individuals
whose houses need saving: “The state has a duty to protect the general
welfare, and one way of carrying out this duty is to ‘deputize’ citizens to
function as part of a monitoring system and, in circumstances in which
assistance can be easily provided, as surrogates for professional
rescuers.”83 Moreover, McIntyre argues, such emergency assistance
“constitutes a reasonable and not excessively burdensome interference
with individual liberty because it applies only to cases in which a fairly
small effort is able to avert a very great harm and the threat arises out of
exceptional circumstances.”84 So one violates a positive duty grounded
in a public duty when one fails to perform an easy rescue.
One worry about this argument is that it would also benefit the public
if everyone refrained from eating fast food, smoking, and drinking
alcohol because public health would be improved significantly, as would
the strain on and cost of healthcare. But we do not say the government
has the authority to legally compel one to volunteer at homeless shelters,
donate to cancer research, eat healthily, or floss daily. There are
innumerable needs in society for which there would be an interest in
legally compelling others to meet, and it would of course be absurd to try
to legally compel one to meet all such needs.
One might object by suggesting that rescue is a particularly important
public benefit. In other words, legally compelling one to easily rescue
another in a life-or-death situation is of a profoundly different character
than legally compelling one to maintain a healthy diet. However, legally
compelling society to maintain a healthy diet would save vastly more
lives—and vastly more money—than legally compelling society to
provide easy rescue in the rare cases one finds oneself in such a situation.
So, though it may sound odd, legally compelling one to maintain a
healthy diet is arguably far more morally significant than legally
compelling one to easily rescue another, at least to the extent one is
80. Alison McIntyre, Guilty Bystanders? On the Legitimacy of Duty to Rescue Statutes, 23
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 157, 181–82 (1994).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 181.
83. Id. at 181–82.
84. Id. at 182.
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working within a utilitarian framework. Of course, many are unconvinced
by utilitarian arguments because they fail to account for the moral
significance of each person, as noted above. This leads to the second issue
that must be examined in the context of legal duties to provide aid to
others: special relationships.85
There is good reason to think the state has authority to impose duties
of aid with respect to special relationships, including because many states
are themselves based upon special relationship theories (e.g., the
contractual relationship in social contract theory). For instance, states in
the liberal tradition are often viewed as a cooperative scheme in which
persons cooperate to produce a morally and prudentially superior
condition than the alternatives. By morally superior I mean that such a
political community is justified inasmuch as it conceives of persons as
free and equal rather than bound by unlimited state authority. Likewise,
with respect to the community’s prudential superiority, I mean to describe
how broadly defined theories in the social contract tradition claim that
there are practical reasons for embracing a cooperative political
community based upon reciprocity. In other words, schemes based upon
reciprocity better preserve the conception of persons as free and equal,
such as by enforcing negative duties and dealing with law-breaking. One
can see this inasmuch as, say, Locke’s political theory is based upon the
goal of eliminating inconveniences. A central component of this goal is
collectively providing for security by centralizing the right to punish, to
eliminate bias, and personal incapacity. The upshot is that many
government regulations in fact enhance liberty rather than restrict it.86
CONCLUSION
The above sketch of liberal and social contract theory highlights the
role of special relationships within those theories. In the same way the
85. McIntyre’s argument draws out this point, namely, that there is a substantial gap
between the way the law treats one who fails to rescue another with whom one has a special
relationship and the way the law treats one who fails to rescue another with whom one has no
relationship. The law can be quite strict in the case of the former, though quite lenient in the case
of the latter (even if a Bad Samaritan law exists). This brings us back to the discussion of
Feinberg’s determinateness in Part I. In other words, is there something morally significant about
cases in which there is a determinate rescuer and rescuee? Does a special relationship exist
between rescuer and rescuee that justifies a legal duty to provide aid? Even if the relationship
between determinate rescuers and rescuees is more similar (than indeterminate rescue/beneficence
situations) to familial, contractual, and professional emergency service relationships, I assume
(based upon the shortcomings of the arguments to distinguish rescue and beneficence in Part I)
that they are not sufficiently similar to justify many legal duties to aid. See generally id.
86. Or consider how Kant’s goal in political philosophy might be described broadly as
making justice possible through omnilateral authorization. IMMANUAL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 30 (Mary Gregor ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797). See also, HUNT, supra
note 72, at 21, for discussion of these points.
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state’s legitimacy may be based upon a special relationship (e.g., a
transactional relationship based upon consent or reciprocation), the state
has the limited authority to legally require one to meet the obligations
derived from one’s special relationships with others. This could be, in
part, based upon the state’s role of eliminating inconveniences noted
above, which prevents one from having to enforce one’s agreements with
others (or having to punish those who fail to honor their agreements).
Although it would of course be difficult to identify exactly which special
relationships—and the exact positive duties that exists within those
relationships—the state has the authority to enforce, it is perhaps less
difficult to identify the broad families of such relationships.
A short list might include contractual relationships, certain familial
relationships, and so-called “seclusion relationships” (situations in which
one prevents another from receiving aid from others).87 So, for example,
the state might have the authority to impose a legal duty to rescue those
with whom one has a contractual relationship (e.g., a contract in which a
caregiver agrees to meet the needs of one who is sick or disabled), a
familial relationship (e.g., parents to their minor children),88 or a
seclusion relationship (e.g., situations in which one has secluded the one
needing aid so as to prevent others from giving aid). Although these
families of special relationships are by no means exhaustive, they
highlight the general ways in which a state might have the limited
authority to compel one in one’s individual capacity to meet the needs of
others. While these families of special relationships no doubt require
exceptions and caveats, they provide a rough framework for grappling
with questions about the legitimacy of laws that require one to rescue
another in one’s individual capacity
Interestingly, the three types of special relationships above track the
three broad theories of a state’s legitimacy discussed earlier: (1)
agreements to aid others track transactional theories of state legitimacy;
(2) familial relationships that generate obligations track associative
theories of state legitimacy; and (3) seclusion relationships track natural

87. Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (1962) (holding that there is no legal duty to rescue
without a special relationship involving (1) a status relationship, such as parent to child; (2) a
contractual duty of care; or (3) a seclusion relationship; of course, the court also held that legal
duties to rescue exist when there is a statute requiring rescue (e.g., Bad Samaritan Laws)—the
issue that this Article addresses).
88. For example, while Locke’s general position is that persons are born equally with a set
of rights that allow them to govern themselves, minor children are not included among such
persons. This is one reason (among others) that states in the liberal and social contract tradition
might have the authority to require parents to aid their minor children.
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duty theories of state legitimacy inasmuch as it would be just to aid those
from whom one secludes others from aiding.89
One might think that these three accounts of a state’s legitimacy
would yield three different conclusions regarding the boundaries of state
authority generally and the boundaries of Bad Samaritan laws
particularly. This is an apt observation, but, as noted in the last section,
one need not take a dogmatic approach with respect to theories about
legitimacy and authority. In other words, it seems reasonable to think that
a state’s legitimacy could be based upon a combination of factors and
theories, such that different theories work in tandem to provide a more
robust account of legitimacy with respect to a larger swath of people. And
regardless of the theory of state legitimacy, there is an overlapping
principle of limited state authority within liberal societies—and this
principle suggests a shared boundary between different theories of state
legitimacy that has implications regarding what can be legislated.90
This raises the broader point of the relationship between state
authority on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the arbitrariness of the
distinction between duties of rescue and beneficence. If the theories of
rescue discussed fail to limit a duty of beneficence in a nonarbitrary way,
then the state may not legitimately impose legal duties to aid others in
one’s individual capacity (e.g., via Bad Samaritan Laws) without some
independent basis from within its (limited) authority. Otherwise, the state
would in a sense have unlimited authority to impose legal duties to aid
others. Of course, many state laws—not just Bad Samaritan Laws—
might involve arbitrary distinctions given the practical difficulty of linedrawing. The legitimate limit of such other laws is a worthy topic of
inquiry, but, here, the point is simply that Bad Samaritan laws raise
unique questions given the fundamental nature of their mandate.
89. These categories are treated as broad families of relationships that lend support to state
authority. This Article claims neither that these are the only ways that Bad Samaritan Laws are
justified, nor that there are no limitations on Bad Samaritan Laws beyond those discussed herein.
90. It seems right to say that theories of legitimacy and authority (whether based upon
transactional, associative, or natural duty theories) do not provide precise limits on the state’s
authority—with respect to legislation or otherwise. For example, the content of one’s consent to
authority is unlikely to be spelled out in significant detail; perhaps the clearest account of consent
to authority would be that of the roughly 20 million naturalized citizens in the U.S. who took a
specific oath to freely support and defend the Constitution, as well as a number of other
commitments. From a narrow, jurisprudential point of view, theories such as legal positivism
(holding that the existence and content of law depends on social facts and not on its merits or
morality) cannot be regarded as sources of obligation to follow the law because that is ultimately
a moral issue that brings us back to fundamental questions about political obligation. See Scott
J. Shapiro, The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN,
ed. A. Ripstein (Cambridge, 2007), for an overview of these issues. The broader point is that
liberal societies are based in part upon a general principle of limited authority that has implications
regarding the boundaries of legislation.
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This tentative conclusion should be tempered by the central role that
reciprocation plays in liberal societies. To be sure, even if one assumed
that individual liberty is the only value for which the government exists,
a view with which this Article does not agree, there is not a strict inverse
correlation between individual liberty and government regulation.
Indeed, as noted above,91 many government regulations in fact enhance
liberty rather than restrict it. More broadly, one of the values promoted
by liberal states is what we might describe colloquially as “helping each
other out” given the role that reciprocation plays in liberal states. These
points highlight the well-known tension between the conception of liberal
states as cooperative schemes in which persons reciprocate and the limits
of such conceptions given liberal theories of legitimate authority. This
tension is often focused upon the line between the state’s authority to
compel one in one’s individual capacity to help another and the state’s
authority to address the broader principles of justice that affect general
welfare on an institutional level.
The upshot is a presumption of reciprocation in liberal states that gives
rise to difficult line-drawing exercises with respect to legitimate and
illegitimate regulations. A principled way to evaluate the legitimacy of
Bad Samaritan Laws is to answer two related questions: (1) On what
ground does a state have the authority to dictate that one’s needs should
be met in the way specified by a particular legal duty? (2) Does a special
relationship exist that authorizes the establishment of such legal duties?
This Article has sketched answers to those questions, leading to the
conclusion that paternalist and moralistic laws—including Bad Samaritan
laws—are sometimes justified and certainly not ruled out in liberal states.
However, they are limited based upon a variety of grounds, including
those that are analogous to the ways in which states might achieve
legitimate, limited authority.

91. HUNT, supra note 72, at 88 (discussing how freedom-limiting aspects of the state may
in fact be a means of protecting freedom, as with Kant’s idea of the state’s role of “a hindering of
a hindrance to freedom”).

